Rent seeking with asymmetric players : an application to litigation expenditures by SALKIN, Svetoslav
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 2 
 
 157 
 
 
 
 
       European Journal of Legal Studies 
 
Title: Rent Seeking with Asymmetric Players: An Application to Litigation Expenditures 
Author(s): Svetoslav Salkin 
Source: European Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2 (Autumn/Winter 2013/14), p 
157-173 
 
Abstract:  
 
This paper uses insights from the literature on rent-seeking contests toanalyze the expenditure 
decisions of a Defendant and a Plaintiff in the course of their legal battle. It is shown that the total 
amount of litigation expenditures is affected by the sequence of moves (protocols of interaction), 
differences in stakes, and the effectiveness of the parties (or the strength of their cases) and information 
asymmetries. In particular, it is shown that allowing for different stakes many of the results in the 
rent-seeking literature may not hold. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I present a simple model that can serve as a framework for analyzing litigants’ 
outlay decisions in the process of their legal battle. The legal battle is modelled as a rent-
seeking contest in which players expend resources in order to increase their probabilities of 
winning a ‘prize’. Thus the paper tries to connect, and heavily borrows from, two fields of 
research: the economics of litigation and the theory of contests (initially considering rent-
seeking contests only). 
 
A traditional question within the economics of litigation is: What affects the decision of 
participants in a legal dispute to go to court instead of settling out?1 The theory of rent 
seeking, on the other hand, tries to determine the relationship between the various 
characteristics of the contest situation and the outlay decisions of the parties involved.2 In 
this paper I analyse these outlay decisions taken by litigants once they have decided to go to 
court. There is a small number of papers that address this specific question, most notably 
Katz3, Hirshleifer,4 Farmer and Pecorino,5 and Kahan and Tuckman ,6 among others. As 
Katz argues the legal battle itself is analytically prior to the decision whether to settle or 
not because this latter decision is affected by the expectations of the players with respect to 
their future legal expenditures. Several papers analyze related questions strictly within the 
context of rent-seeking contests. Risse analyses the total volume of rent-seeking 
expenditures for one-stage and two-stage rent-seeking contests involving players with 
negatively interdependent preferences, and concludes that rent dissipation is larger for one-
stage contests.7 Yates presents a particularly interesting formulation in which the winner in 
a rent-seeking contest is selected probabilistically and pays her bid, while the other 
contestant pays nothing.8 He also studies how private information regarding the contest’s 
stakes affects the equilibrium outcome. Contests in which only the winner pays her bid, 
however, do not model any meaningful kind of litigation contest. Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta use a general rent-seeking contest formulation similar to the one presented in 
this paper to show that minor changes in the parameters of the contest success function 
could result in rather substantial differences in rent dissipation.9 The results obtained in this 
paper are therefore special cases of the more general conclusions of Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta. 
 
The model in this paper analyses how litigation expenditures are affected by differences in 
terms of stakes and effectiveness of the litigants (or merit of their cases), as well as by 
informational asymmetries regarding the stakes. Linster10 presents a rent-seeking model in 
                                                 
1 See Thomas J Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation (OUP 1997). 
2 For a selective survey see Shumel Nitzan, ‘Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests’ (1994) 10 Eur J of Political 
Economy 41-60. 
3 Avery Katz, ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’ (1988) 8 Intl Rev of L and Economics 127-
143. 
4 Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory (CUP 2001). 
5 Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino, ‘Legal Expenditures as a Rent-Seeking Game’ (1999) 100 Public Choice 
271-88. 
6 Marcel Kahan and Bruce Tuckman, ‘Special Levies on Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency Problems and 
Litigation Problems‘ (1995) 15 Intl Rev of L and Econmics 175-88. 
7 Sina Risse, ‘Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking with Negatively Interdependent Preferences’ (2011) 147 Public 
Choice 259-276. 
8 Andrew J Yates, ‘Winner-Pay Contests’ (2011) 147 Public Choice 93-106. 
9 Subhasish Chowdhury and Roman Sheremeta, ‘A Generalized Tullock Contest’ (2011) 147 Public Choice 
413-420. 
10 Bruce G Linster, ’Stackelberg Rent Seeking’ (1993) 77 Public Choice 307-21. 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 2 
 
 160 
which players attach different values to the ‘prize’ they seek to win, while Kohli11 and 
Dixit12 study how differences in effectiveness affect rent-seeking outlays. Specifically, Kohli 
and Dixit show that the more ‘effective’ player commits to higher level rent-seeking outlays. 
The model in this paper shows that this result is crucially dependent on the assumption of 
equal stakes. Once this assumption is relaxed, as in Linster’s model, Kohli’s result, which he 
calls the Underdog Theorem, ceases to hold. With regard to asymmetric information, Fu13 
showed that informational asymmetries regarding the value of the ‘prize’ are welfare 
enhancing in the context of sequential rent-seeking protocols, as they suppress the 
expenditures of the informed contestant. Section 3.3 of this paper shows that Fu’s result is 
valid even when litigants differ in terms of effectiveness. 
 
The next section presents the general setting and relates it to the literature. Section 3 
specializes the model, motivates its assumptions, derives the equilibrium expenditures under 
the so called American rule for allocation of litigation costs for two protocols of interaction, 
Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg, and analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries. 
Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITIGATION AS A RENT-SEEKING CONTEST 
 
The simple world I envisage consists of a Plaintiff and a Defendant who are risk-neutral and 
have decided to go to trial. The economics of litigation literature explains the fact that 
people sue each other by referring to differences in perceptions regarding the outcome of 
the trial, ie each litigant is overly optimistic about her chances of winning.14 Failure to 
settle, however, might be also due to attitudes towards risk or simply to malevolence.15 
 
Once at trial, the parties decide on their litigation expenditures (or legal efforts). The 
literature offers different interpretations here. Katz speaks about search of supporting 
arguments or favourable facts to be presented to a court, jury or administrative agency.16 
Hirshleifer adopts a more general interpretation which may include costs of lawyers, 
resources devoted to factual investigation and legal research, and bribery.17 The litigation 
expenditures affect the probabilities of winning. Note that I am ignoring the Principal-
Agent problems that exist between the litigants and their attorneys. It is not impossible, 
however, to extend the analysis along these lines following Baik and Kim18 and 
Schoonebeek.19  
 
I will use the following notation: 
 
 Vp - the stakes for the Plaintiff 
 Vd –the stakes for the Defendant 
 xp – legal expenditures of Plaintiff 
 xd – legal expenditure of Defendant   
                                                 
11 Inderjit Kohli, ’Institutional Structure, Strategic Behavior and Rent-Seeking Costs’ [1994] Working Paper 
279, University of California Santa Cruz, Department of Economics. 
12 Avinash Dixit, ‘Strategic Behavior in Contests’ (1987) 77 American Economic Rev 891-98. 
13 Qiang Fu, ‘Endogenous Timing of Contests with Asymmetric Information’ (2006) 129 Public Choice 1-23. 
14 Miceli (n 1). 
15 Hirshleifer (n 4). 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
18 Kyung Hwan Baik and In-Gyu Kim, ‘Delegation in Contests’ (1997) 13 Eur J of Political Economy 281-98. 
19 Lambert Schoonbeek, ‘A Delegated Agent in a Winner-Takes-All Contest’ (2002) 9 Applied Economics 
Letters 21-23. 
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 p – payoff to Plaintiff 
 d – payoff to Defendant 
 Pp – probability that Plaintiff wins 
 Pd – probability that Defendant wins 
 
Following the standard setting of the theory of contests, the objective functions of the 
players are formalized as follows: 
 
 The Plaintiff chooses xp so as to maximize 
 
(1) ppdppp xVxxP  ),(  
 
 Similarly, the Defendant chooses xp so as to maximize  
 
(2)  dddpdd xVxxP  ),(  
 
The important parts of these expressions are the probabilities of winning Pp and Pd . 
Hirshleifer calls them ‘contest success functions’.
20 The usual assumptions are that each 
player’s probability of winning is increasing in her own expenditures and decreasing in the 
expenditures of her opponent, and that they sum up to one. Tullock’s seminal paper offers 
the classical formulation, which for two players looks as follows: 
 
(3)    


dp
i
dpi
xx
x
xxP

),( , i=p,d, 
where  is a measure of the relative decisiveness of contest efforts. The intuition behind this 
game is the following: 
 
…we assume two parties who are participating in a lottery under somewhat unusual rules. 
Each is permitted to buy as many lottery tickets as he wishes at one dollar each, the lottery 
tickets are put in a drum, one is pulled out, and whoever owns that ticket wins the prize.21 
 
Hirshleifer offers two canonical formulations of contest success functions, one in which the 
relative success depends on the ratios of the respective expenditures (essentially Tullock’s 
formula), and another in which success depends on the difference between the 
expenditures.22   
  
In the context of litigation expenditures expressions (1) and (2) can be extended in order to 
analyze the effect of different cost-allocation rules. Shavell23 discusses four possible systems: 
 
(i) Under the American system where each party bears her own costs the 
objective functions are as above. 
 
                                                 
20 Jack Hirshleifer, ‘Conflict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Models of Relative 
Success’ (1989) 63 Public Choice 101-12. 
21 Gordon Tullock, ‘Efficient Rent-Seeking’ in James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison and Gordon Tullock 
Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society (A&M Press 1980) 97-112. 
22 The difference formulation, however, is not very convenient as it often requires numerical solutions.  
23 Steven Shavell, ‘Suit Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the 
Allocation of Legal Costs‘ (1982) 11 J of L Studies 55-82. 
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(ii) Under the British system the losing party bears all the costs. The objective 
functions are as follows  
 
(iii) Under the system favoring the Defendant, each party bears her own costs if 
the Plaintiff wins, but the Plaintiff bears all the costs if the Defendant wins. The objective 
functions are 
 
(iv) Under the system favoring the Plaintiff, each party bears her own costs if the 
Defendant wins, but the Defendant bears all the costs if the Plaintiff wins. The objective 
functions are 
 
 
Other extensions are also possible. Miceli discusses the so-called ‘Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure’ according to which a Plaintiff who refuses a settlement offer pays 
the Defendant’s post-offer legal costs if the Plaintiff receives a judgement at trial less than 
the rejected offer.24 Daughety and Reinganum25 consider ‘split-award’ statutes which 
allocate a portion of punitive damages awards won by successful plaintiffs to the state. 
 
3. A SPECIALIZED MODEL  
 
In order to derive analytical solutions, I select a particularly simple variant of contest 
success function, which nevertheless allows for obtaining non-trivial results. The model in 
this section combines and extends the rent-seeking models of Linster26 and Kohli.27 Both of 
these papers keep the spirit of the Tullock’s rent-seeking model, but modify some of his 
details. In particular, Linster analyzed a game where the players attach different values to 
the rent they compete for, while Kohli analyzed the case where the players differ in their 
effectiveness. Here I allow for both, ie the players differ both in their valuations of the 
stakes (VpVd) and in their effectiveness. 
 
Differences in stakes are particularly relevant in litigation since this is an empirically 
confirmed fact. From a sample of federal civil cases from the Southern District of New York 
(SDNY), filed between 1984 and 1987 and terminated by the end of 1998, Waldfogel28 
infers that the highest stake asymmetry pertains to intellectual property cases. The 
estimates indicate that Plaintiffs stand to gain 33.6 percent more than Defendants stand to 
lose. Second are contract cases, whereby Plaintiff’s stakes are again higher. The lowest stake 
asymmetry estimate (but still statistically significant) pertains to torts, whereby 
                                                 
24 ibid, 170-171. 
25 Andrew F Daughety and Jennifer F Reinganum, ‘Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of 
Punitive Damages Cases‘ (2003) 5 American L and Economics Rev 134-64. 
26 Linster (n 10). 
27 Kohli (n 11) 
28 Joel Waldfogel, ‘The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory‘ (1995) 
103 J of Political Economy 229-60. 
dpixxxxVxxP dpdpidpii ,,))(,( 
ddddpdddpdpdppp xxVxxPxxxVxxP  ))(,(;))(,( 
dppddpddpppdppp xxxVxxPxxVxxP  ))(,(;))(,( 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 2 
 
 163 
Defendant’s stakes are higher.29 A possible explanation is that when a tort Defendant loses 
she is often exposed to potential liability from additional Plaintiffs. Similarly, a losing 
intellectual property Plaintiff is more likely to become subject of additional 
encroachments.30 
 
The assumption of differences in effectiveness, on the other hand, is difficult to evaluate 
empirically, but actually has strong intuitive appeal. Hirshleifer and Osborne 31 speak of one 
side or the other being more adept in converting legal effort into desirable outcome. Note, 
however, that a ‘differences in effectiveness’ parameter can represent differences in the true 
strength of the cases of the sides (ie one of the litigants having a more meritorious case) or 
the true degree of Defendant’s fault. In what follows I will speak of one side being more 
effective than the other (although the true degree of Defendant’s fault might be more 
appropriate). 
 
A prominent example of the double asymmetry discussed in this paper is a lawsuit filed by 
Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky against his former business partner, Roman 
Abramovich, in the UK in 2011-2012.32 Both businessmen were very close to former 
Russian President Boris Yeltzin in the 1990s, and used their political influence to amass 
huge fortunes through the Russian government’s controversial loans-for-shares 
privatization programme. Whereas Roman Abramovich remained close to the Kremlin 
during the terms of President Putin, who succeeded Boris Yeltzin, and President Medvedev, 
Boris Berezovsky has been forced to flee to the UK in 2000 and was later convicted in 
absentia over alleged embezzlement and related crimes in Russia. 
 
In 2011, Boris Berezovsky launched what turned out to be one of the most expensive 
lawsuits in the history of the UK against Roman Abramovich. The litigation expenditures 
associated with the four-month legal battle exceeded £100 million.33 Boris Berezovsky 
claimed that Roman Abramovich had used ‘threats’ and ‘intimidation’ to make him and 
Georgian-born businessman Badri Patarkatsishvili sell their stakes in oil firm Sibneft 
and aluminum producer RusAl at excessively low prices. All in all, Boris Berezovsky 
sought over $5 billion in compensation for the ‘coerced’ sale of his stake in Sibneft, and over 
$564 million in compensation for the ‘coerced’ sale of his stake in RusAl.34 
 
Roman Abramovich, however, denied that Boris Berezovsky and Badri Patarkatsishvili 
owned  any stakes in Sibneft and RusAl, and alleged that he had paid a total of $2.3 billion 
to Boris Berezovsky in exchange for ‘political protection’. Indeed, Boris Berezovsky failed to 
present any documents proving his claims. He insisted instead that all agreements 
regarding ownership in the two firms had been made orally. The court dismissed all claims 
                                                 
29 Waldfogel’s study is much richer than that. In particular, he finds strong support for the so-called selection 
hypothesis according to which the sample of tried cases is unrepresentative of the population of underlying 
disputes (see also Miceli (n 1) 138) 
30 ibid, 253. 
31 Jack Hirshleifer and Evan W Osborne, ‘Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle‘ (2001) 108 Public Choice 169-
195. 
32 Jane Croft, ’Abramovich Case Awaits Ruling‘ Financial Times (London, 28 August 2012) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fca2aa3a-f124-11e1-b7b9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2SatyOLoD> accessed 3 
May 2013. 
33 Jane Croft and Neil Buckley, ‘Berezovsky Loses against Abramovich‘ Financial Times (London 31 August 
2012)  <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8eec8602-f34d-11e1-9c6c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2SKTwRxp3> 
accessed 3 May 2013. 
34 Executive Summary of the Full Judgement of Gloster J in Berezovsky v Abramovich, Action 2007 Folio 942 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/berezovsky-abramovich-
summary.pdf> accessed 13 May 2013. 
 VOLUME 6 EJLS    ISSUE 2 
 
 164 
made by Boris Berezovsky. He was described by Judge Elisabeth Gloster as ‘an 
unimpressive, and inherently unreliable, witness, who regarded truth as a transitory, 
flexible concept, which could be moulded to suit his current purposes’. Some of the evidence 
he gave was described as ‘deliberately dishonest’. Roman Abramovich’s answers, on the 
other hand, were considered ‘careful and thoughtful’. He was furthermore described as a 
‘truthful, and on the whole reliable witness’ and ‘frank in making concessions where they 
were due’.35 
 
The lawsuit was obviously a desperate move by Boris Berezovsky, who had allegedly lost 
most of his wealth by the time of the trial. At the same time, Roman Abramovich, with an 
estimated net worth of around $11.2 billion, was still one of the richest and most influential 
Russian oligarchs.36 Therefore, the marginal utility of the $5.564 billion sought by Boris 
Berezovsky was clearly much larger for Boris Berezovsky himself than it was for Roman 
Abramovich. Regarding the relative merits of the claims of the litigants, it must have been 
patently clear to both of them that given the lack of any written evidence or witnesses other 
than Boris Berezovsky, all Roman Abramovich had to do to win the case was deny anything 
that Boris Berezovsky claimed.  
 
With the above remarks and example in mind, the contest success functions I will use are 
the following 
 
 
 
here a denotes the relative effectiveness of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is more effective when 
a>1.37 
 
The major disadvantage of such a simple formulation is that it cannot be meaningfully 
applied to all four cost allocation systems outlined in the previous section. Except for the 
American system, it turns out that in equilibrium one of the players spends an infinite 
amount of resources in the legal conflict.38 More complicated formulations avoid this 
problem, the disadvantage, however, is that the analysis should proceed by calculating 
numerical solutions (this is actually a problem in many rent-seeking models). The present 
formulation, however, nicely fits the American rule, thus I consider this system only leaving 
the other three for further investigation. 
 
Under the American system the objective functions of the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
respectively are  
                                                 
35 ibid. 
36 Forbes (New York, 10 October 2010) <http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/10/billionaires-2010_Roman-
Abramovich_DG3G.html> accessed 5 May 2013. 
37 If the effectiveness of the players are measured by ei, i=p,d, the contest success functions become 
ddpp
ii
xexe
xe

. The above expressions are derived by setting 
d
p
e
e
a  . 
38 To prove that this is the case for the British system, note that differentiating the Plaintiff’s objective 
function and setting it equal yields )1( axV pp  , which is positive and is independent of dx . The same 
holds for the Defendant’s objective function. 
dp
d
dpd
dp
p
dpp
xax
x
xxP
xax
ax
xxP



 ),(;),(
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(4)   pp
dp
p
p xV
xax
ax


 , and  
(5)   dd
dp
d
d xV
xax
x


 . 
  
I examine two protocols or interaction, Cournot-Nash, ie when the players move 
simultaneously or in ignorance of each other’s moves and Stackelberg, when the players 
move sequentially. I assume that it is the Plaintiff who moves first and commits to a level of 
expenditures. Hirshleifer and Osborne also consider what they call a ‘threat-and promise’ 
protocol in which the Defendant makes the prior commitment. The objective functions 
considered in this paper however are symmetric, which makes such an extension 
unnecessary. 
 
3.1. Cournot-Nash Protocol of Interaction 
 
The Cournot-Nash setting represents a standard simultaneous move game. Differentiating 
the objective functions and setting them equal to zero gives the following reaction functions 
 
(6)    
a
xxaV
xx
ddp
dp

)(  
 
(7)    ppdpd axxaVxx )(  
At Nash equilibrium the expenditures of the players are 
 
(8)    
2
2
)( dp
pdc
p
VaV
VaV
x

  
 
(9)    
2
2
)( dp
dpc
d
VaV
VaV
x

  
Thus the total amount of litigation expenditures in equilibrium, ie ** dp
c xxC   is 
 
(10)    
2)(
)(
dp
dppdc
VaV
VVVaV
C


 , 
where the superscripts c stands for Cournot-Nash. 
 
Kohli39 shows that the total level of expenditures (in his terminology, rent-seeking costs) is 
maximized when the players are equally effective, ie when a=1. The result holds, however, 
only if the players attach the same value to the rent they are competing for (have the same 
stakes), ie whenever Vp=Vd. To find the maximization point under the current setting, I 
differentiate (10) with respect to a and set it equal to zero. 
 
                                                 
39 Kohli (n 11). 
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(11)    
3)(
))((
dp
pddppd
c
VaV
aVVVVVV
a
C





 
  
This is equal to zero at 
p
d
V
V
a  . In other words, in the Cournot-Nash setting the litigation 
expenditures are maximized when the relative effectiveness of the players equals the ratio of 
their stakes. 
 
It is also interesting to find the equilibrium payoffs of the players derived by Linster40 for 
equally effective players, and show that they differ when asymmetric effectiveness is 
introduced. The expressions are the following 
 
(12)   












dp
d
dp
pc
d
c
p
c
p
VaV
V
VaV
aV
xx 1),(
2
 , for the Plaintiff, and 
 
(13)   












dp
d
dp
dc
d
c
p
c
d
VaV
V
VaV
V
xx 1),(
2
 , for the Defendant. 
 
When the players have equal effectiveness, a is equal to 1 and I obtain Linster’s result 
2
2
)(
),(
dp
ic
d
c
p
c
i
VV
V
xx

 , for i=p,d. 
 
3.2. Stackelberg Protocol of Interaction  
 
In this setting the players move in sequence. Dixit41 analyzes a more general model than the 
present one and identifies a very interesting result: If pre-commitment to effort level (in my 
case litigation expenditures) is allowed, then the ‘favorite’ in the contest will commit herself 
to a higher level of effort than would have been the case if commitment was not allowed, 
and the ‘underdog’ will commit herself to a lower level. Hirshleifer and Osborne reach the 
same conclusion.42 Kohli obtains a similar result independently and calls it the ‘Underdog 
Theorem’. The interesting implication for the present analysis is that the total litigation 
expenditures under Stackelberg differ from Cournot-Nash. The present section enriches 
Kohli’s formulation by allowing for different stakes. 
 
I assume that the Plaintiff moves first. The game is solved along the lines of backwards 
induction, ie what I derive is the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game. Knowing the 
best response function of the Defendant (expression (7)), the Plaintiff’s objective function 
becomes 
 
(14)   p
d
p
ppdpp x
V
ax
Vxxx ))(,(  
 
                                                 
40 Linster (n 10). 
41 Dixit (n 12). 
42 ibid, 160. 
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This is maximized at 
 
(15)   
d
ps
p
V
aV
x
4
2
  
 
The Defendant’s response is  
 
(16)   






 

d
pdps
d
V
aVVaV
x
2
2
2
, which is positive for pd VVa /2 . For 
pd VVa /2 , however, the Defendant spends zero in equilibrium and the Plaintiff spends 
aVd / . 
 
It is straightforward now to present Dixit’s over-commitment result for equal stakes. If 
21  a (ie the effectiveness of the Plaintiff is higher) the Plaintiff’s equilibrium 
expenditures in the Stackelberg protocol are greater than the respective expenditures in the 
Cournot-Nash setting. The result is obtained after examining the inequality sp
c
p xx  . 
Substituting the respective expressions from (8) and (15) and setting pd VV   this inequality 
boils down to a>1, which is true by assumption. As Hirshleifer and Osborne put it “merit 
and effort are complements”.
43 Of course, with asymmetric stakes the result holds only if 
pd VVa / , ie when the relative effectiveness parameter is larger than the ratio of the 
stakes. 
 
I further examine the total expenditures in the Stackelberg scenario for pd VVa /2 , by 
summing 
s
d
s
p xandx . This results in 
 
(17)   









 1
2
)1(
2 d
pps
V
aVaV
C , which is maximized at 
 
(18)   









p
d
V
V
a
2
1
. 
 
If the stakes are equal, the result coincides with the one obtained by Kohli (Proposition 2) - 
total outlays in the Stackelberg setting are maximized when the Plaintiff’s effectiveness is 
greater, ie at a=3/2. The present formulation shows that this need not be the case with 
asymmetric stakes. If pd VV 2 , ie the stakes of the Defendant are sufficiently smaller than 
those of the Plaintiff, the litigation expenditures reach their maximum at a point where the 
Defendant is more effective, a<1. This result is perhaps best explained by the fact that stake 
asymmetries change the relative marginal benefits of litigation expenditures. In other 
words, if the stake of the Plaintiff is sufficiently larger than the stake of the Defendant, then 
the Plaintiff’s marginal benefits from an extra unit of expenditures on litigation is too small, 
and therefore not worth making, if the Plaintiff’s effectiveness, or the merit of her case, is 
sufficiently smaller than the Defendant’s effectiveness, of the merit of her case. 
                                                 
43 ibid, 161. 
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Let us see now the net payoffs of the players in the Stackelberg scenario. For the Plaintiff, 
the net payoff is 
 
(19)   
d
ps
d
s
p
s
p
V
aV
xx
4
),(
2
 , for pd VVa /2 , and 
(20)   
a
VaV
xx
dps
d
s
p
s
p


2
),( , for pd VVa /2 . 
  
The net payoffs for the Defendant respectively are  
 
(21)   







 1
4
),(
d
p
pd
s
d
s
p
s
d
V
aV
aVVxx , for pd VVa /2 , and 
(22)   0),( sd
s
p
s
d xx , for pd VVa /2 . 
 
Now it is possible to compare the net payoff of the Plaintiff in the Stackelberg setting with 
the respective payoff under the Cournot-Nash protocol for pd VVa /2 . The interesting 
result to note is that the net payoff of the Plaintiff is always better in the Stackelberg 
protocol than on the Cournot-Nash protocol. This becomes evident when examining the 
following inequality  
 
    ),(),( cd
c
p
c
p
s
d
s
p
s
p xxxx   . 
  
After substituting with the respective expressions from (19) and (12) and rearranging this 
expression reduces to 2)(0 dp VaV  , which is obviously true. Under the present 
formulation, however, similar comparisons with respect to the Defendant yield ambiguous 
results.  
 
Next, for the sake of completeness, I compare the amount of total litigation expenditures 
under the two protocols of interaction. First, by examining expressions (10) and (17) it is 
easy to check that total outlays are equal under Cournot-Nash and under Stackelberg if the 
players are equally effective and have equal stakes (a=1, Vp=Vd). Similarly, in this case, their 
net payoffs are the same (by checking expressions (12), (13), and (19) through (22)). Second, 
with equal stakes, but not necessarily equal effectiveness this no longer holds. For 
Vp=Vd=V and a<2, subtracting sC  from cC  results in 
 
(23)    )1)(5(
)1(
2
2
aa
a
aV
CC sc 

 . 
This is positive for a<1, zero for a=0, and negative for a>1.  
 
For a>2, the expenditures of the Defendant in the Stackelberg protocol are zero, and the 
total amount of expenditures is simply 
V/a. Thus  
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(24)    )12(
)1(
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

 aa
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V
CC sc . 
This is negative for 212  a , and non-negative for 21a . 
  
What is the intuition behind these results? The litigation expenditures are lower in the 
Stackelberg protocol than in Cournot-Nash for a<1. The Defendant spends less because she 
is strategically disadvantaged, while the Plaintiff spends less because she is less effective. If 
211  a , the expenditures are higher in the Stackelberg protocol because the leader 
spends more to take advantage of her increased effectiveness. For even larger values the 
Plaintiff is much more effective, the defendant spends zero and the total level of 
expenditures is again lower. 
 
It can be also shown that for a<1 the net payoff of the Defendant is lower under Stackelberg 
than under Cournot-Nash. Having in mind that this is true for the Plaintiff for any a, 
Kohli’s claim (recast in the terminology of this paper) is that if the Plaintiff is less effective, 
the Stackelberg equilibrium is more efficient than the corresponding Cournot-Nash, ie leads 
to a lower level of expenditures and higher payoffs for the litigants. 
  
Finally, it is possible to compare the litigation expenditures when the players are equally 
effective, a=1, but the stakes are different 
 
 (25)   )(
)(2
pd
dp
psc VV
VV
V
CC 

  
 
This is positive for pd VV  , negative for pd VV  , and zero for equal stakes. In words, with 
equal effectiveness the total level of expenditures is greater in the Cournot-Nash case if the 
Defendant has larger stake, otherwise the Stackelberg case involves a higher level of 
expenditures. 
 
3.3. Rent Seeking with Asymmetric Information Regarding the Value of the Prize 
 
The last extension of the basic litigation model considered in this paper assumes that the 
two contestants attach the same value to the prize, but one of the contestants has superior 
information about that value. The most interesting scenario in this setting occurs when the 
contestants move sequentially, as this would have the informed contestant trying to signal 
her information to the uninformed contestant. 
 
A prominent example of lawsuits with asymmetric information involves disputes over oil 
extraction rights. Firms bidding for oil rights typically attach the same value to the ‘prize’ 
they bid for. In the terminology of auction theory they have common values Cramton.44 
Once a firm wins the right to search for oil, it quickly updates its estimate for the actual 
value of the deposit in question. Suppose then that one of the losing bidders takes the 
winner to court over alleged irregularities during the bidding process. If the winner (or 
Defendant) is the first one to choose litigation expenditures, then the interaction has the 
structure of a signaling game.45 
                                                 
44 Peter Cramton, ‘How Best to Auction Oil Rights’ in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D Sachs, and Joseph E 
Stiglitz (eds), Escaping the Resource Curse (Columbia University Press 2007). 
45 Michael Spence, ‘Job Market Signaling’ (1973) 87 Q J of Economics 355-374. 
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Fu,46 among others, analyzed such an extension and reported the main result obtained in 
this subsection, namely that the low value informed contestant would like to spend less on 
rent seeking in order to credibly prove that the prize’s value is indeed low. Hence, in the 
context of dissipative contests (lobbying, corruption and other rent seeking contests), 
informational asymmetries are welfare enhancing in that they reduce the total amount of 
rent-seeking expenditures. In the literature on industrial organization Gal-Or47 studies 
Cournot’s duopoly model when one of the firms is better informed about demand. Tirole 
48 
provides an especially instructive presentation of Gal-Or’s model and the analysis below 
follows Tirole’s exposition. This subsection shows that Fu’s result remains valid in the case 
of differences in effectiveness. In other words, informational asymmetries reduce litigation 
expenditures even when effectiveness asymmetries are allowed.49 The remainder of the 
subsection assumes that the informed contestant moves first in order to send a signal 
regarding the value of the prize. 
 
Assume that the Defendant and the Plaintiff attach the same value to a prize, but this value 
can be of two types, VL and VH, such that 0 < VL  < VH. The Defendant learns the prize’s type, 
which hereafter will be referred to as the Defendant’s type, and chooses her rent seeking 
expenditures. Thereafter the Plaintiff observes the Defendant‘s choice, but not her type, and 
chooses her rent seeking expenditures. This ends the game.  
 
To find the sequential equilibria of this game, denote the Plaintiff‘s prior beliefs by p(VL) = q 
and p(VH) = 1 – q. After observing the Defendant‘s move, the Plaintiff updates her beliefs as 
follows pº(VL  x1) = μ(x1) and pº(VH  x1) = 1 – μ(x1) and maximizes her payoff function given 
these updated beliefs. Symbolically, the Plaintiff maximizes the following expression 
 
(26)          p
pd
p
HdLd x
xx
x
VxVx 

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
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Hence her best response function is given by  
 
(27)           dHdLdddpd xVxVxxxxxBR   1  
 
Expression (27) is decreasing in μ(xd), the belief that the prize is low, therefore, the 
Defendant will try to convince the Plaintiff that the prize is low in order to make the 
Plaintiff devote less resources to rent seeking and thereby increase her (the Defendant’s) 
chances of winning.  
 
Using incentive compatibility logic, it is straightforward to show that in any separating 
equilibrium the Defendant spends more resources on litigation when the prize is high. 
Denote the optimal choices of the high and the low type by Hdx and 
L
dx , respectively. To 
ensure that these choices satisfy incentive compatibility, it must be the case that neither 
                                                 
46 Fu (n 13) 
47 E Gal-Or, ‘First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information’ (1987) 54 Rev of Economic Studies 279-
292. 
48 Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press 1988) 450-452. 
49 A more complete treatment would include stake asymmetries as well. However, such an extension makes the 
model technically very difficult and should be treated in a separate paper. 
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type has an incentive to select the equilibrium choice of the other type. In other words, the 
following two inequalities should be satisfied 
 
(28)    
   
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The first inequality is the low type’s incentive compatibility condition and the second 
inequality is the high type’s incentive compatibility condition. Subtracting the right hand 
side of (ICH) from the left-had side of (ICL), and subtracting the right-hand side of (ICH) 
from the from the left-hand side of (ICH) yields  
 
(30)     
 
 
 LdLd
L
d
LHH
d
H
d
H
d
LH
xBRx
x
VV
xBRx
x
VV
 


  
 
Since VL < VH, this expression is equivalent to 
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From expression (27) it can be shown that the best response correspondence BR(.) is an 
increasing concave function, hence the last inequality is true if and only if  Ld
H
d xx  , which 
proves the claim that the high-type Defendant spends more on litigation than the low-type 
Defendant. 
 
 The remaining part of this sub-section identifies the separating equilibria of the 
game. 
 
3.4 Separation 
 
In a separating equilibrium the type of the Defendant is revealed. The preceding analysis 
implies that the high type plays her full information strategy, 4HV ,
4
HV , and obtains her 
full equilibrium payoff, 4HV . Denote the low type’s separating equilibrium strategy by 
LS
dx . To simplify notation, set 
LS
dxL   . 
 
To achieve separation, in equilibrium the beliefs of the players should be confirmed. The 
incentive compatibility constraint for the low type that sustains such an outcome is the 
following  
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The incentive compatibility constraint for the high type is given by 
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Next, if the low type is thought to be a high type and maximizes her payoff function given 
that belief, she (the low type) would obtain 
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Hence, the following rationality condition should hold 
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This inequality is satisfied for  
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To conclude, the range of separating equilibria is given by 
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Typically signalling games exhibit a multiplicity of both pooling and separating equilibria. 
Most equilibrium refinements developed by game theorists select the least-cost-separating 
equilibrium, or Riley equilibrium.50 Following the intuitive criterion proposed by Cho and 
Kreps,51 least-cost separation occurs at the upper bound of the interval in expression (37). 
 
(38)    
 
L
HLHHLCS
d
V
VVVV
x
4
2
2 
  
Hence the low type has an incentive to bid below its equilibrium strategy under complete 
information in order to credibly prove her knowledge. The expression LCSdx  is increasing in 
HV  and is decreasing in LV . 
 
4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Whether Stackelberg or Cournot-Nash is the appropriate protocol and the extent to which 
asymmetric information plays a role in the Stackelberg setting is context-specific and 
depends very much on the information flows between the players. Clearly this is a crucial 
                                                 
50 John Riley, ‘Informational Equilibrium’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 331-359. 
51 In-Koo Cho and David Kreps, ‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria’ (1987) 102 Q J of Economics 179-
221. 
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question when it comes to empirical testing. Nevertheless, the present analysis can be 
helpful in advancing some propositions. Most of the results below are obtained by others in 
the literature. Allowing for different stakes, however, leads to a number of modifications.  
 
The results in the paper are as follows: 
 
1. In the Cournot-Nash protocol the level of litigation expenditures is maximized 
when the relative effectiveness (or the relative merit of the cases) of the parties 
equals the ratio of their stakes. In the Stackelberg protocol with equal stakes the 
level of litigation expenditures is maximized when the Plaintiff’s effectiveness 
(merit) is sufficiently greater. With unequal stakes, however, this is no longer true. 
If the stakes of Defendant are sufficiently smaller, the litigation expenditures reach a 
maximum at a point where the Defendant is more effective (has stronger case). 
 
2. In the Stackelberg protocol the Plaintiff’s expenditures are greater than in 
Cournot-Nash if her effectiveness (merit) is higher (but not too high, 1<a<2). 
 
3. If the stake of the Plaintiff is sufficiently smaller than the stake of the Defendant, 
relative to her effectiveness or the merit of her case, the Plaintiff is better off (has 
higher net payoff) in the Stackelberg protocol than in Cournot-Nash, ie pre-
commitment is desirable for the Plaintiff. The situation of the Defendant is 
ambiguous. 
 
4. With equal stakes, if the Plaintiff is less effective (has less merit), the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is more efficient than the corresponding Cournot-Nash, ie leads to lower 
legal expenditures and higher payoffs for the litigants (Kohli’s “Underdog theorem”). 
Again the result may not hold if the stakes are different. 
 
5. With equal effectiveness, the total level of expenditures is greater in the Cournot-
Nash protocol if the Defendant has a larger stake, otherwise the Stackelberg 
protocol involves a higher level of expenditures. 
 
6. Informational asymmetries tend to suppress litigation expenditures regardless of 
differences in effectiveness or merit, as the informed party has an incentive to signal 
the low value of the prize to the uninformed party. With asymmetric information 
total litigation expenditures might be smaller than litigation expenditures in the 
cases of perfect information or imperfect but symmetric information, ie when both 
litigants lack information. 
 
A number of extensions are possible. In particular, it is important to examine what happens 
under the different cost allocation rules outlined in section 2. Furthermore, a more realistic 
analysis would explicate the role of the decision maker, ie the court or the jury. The analysis 
of Congelton offers a general framework for addressing this problem.52 Finally, the 
principal-agent problems in the relationships between the litigants and their attorneys 
should be accounted for. 
                                                 
52 Roger D Congelton, ‘Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort’ (1984) 25 J of Public Economics 197-209. 
